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Environmental Law—Federal Regulation of Aircraft Noise Under
Federal Aviation Act Precludes Local Police Power Noise
Restrictions—City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc. 1 ---Responding to noise disturbances created by commercial air
traffic, the City Council of Burbank, California, adopted a curfew
ordinance prohibiting jet take-offs from the privately owned
Hollywood-Burbank Airport between the hours of 11 p.m. and 7
a.m. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. (Lockheed), the airport owner,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California to invalidate the ordinance and enjoin its enforcement,
contending that the ordinance • was an unreasonable burden on inter-
state commeerce, that it conflicted with regulations promulgated by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and that federal regula-
tion of air commerce was so pervasive as to preempt local legislation
in the area. Despite Burbank's assertion that noise regulation has
traditionally been a subject, within the scope of state police power,
the district court accepted Lockheed's contentions and found the
Burbank ordinance unconstitutional. 2 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed 3 on the grounds that extensive federal legisla-
tion preempted local regulation and that such local regulation
conflicted with FAA regulations.
Affirming the injunction against enforcement of the Burbank
ordinance, 4 the Supreme Court of the United States found it neces-
sary to each only the preemption issue. 5 Accordingly, the Court
HELD: non-federal noise regulation enacted under the state police
power was preempted by the pervasive scheme for federal regulation
of aircraft noise embodied in the Federal Aviation Act. 6
Because the Hollywood-Burbank Airport was not owned by the
city, the facts of the case did not require the court to address the
problem of cities attempting to regulate airports as proprietors.
Furthermore, the Court expressly limited its holding to the preemp-
tion of noise regulation by municipalities which are not the owners
of the airports they seek to regulate.? The impact of the Burbank
holding upon the power and scope of local regulation of aircraft
noise is thus: somewhat unclear, especially in light of the fact that
1
 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
2
 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
3 457 F,2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972).
4
 411 U.S. at 626.
5
 Id. at 633.
6
 Id. The doctrine of preemption, based on the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution (art. VI, cl. 2), is used by`the courts to invalidate state laws which either conflict
with federal laws—as when compliance with both the federal and non-federal standards is
impossible—or which Congress explicitly or implicitly intended to forbid by enacting national
legislation: See, e.g., Note, 13 B.C. Ind. Si Corn. L. Rev. 813, 814-15 (1972). Viewed
somewhat differently, the contentions that state laws directly conflict with or are preempted
by federal enactments may be considered as two distinct objections to state legislation. See
Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 829 (1974).
7
 411 U.S. at 636 n.14.
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nearly every major urban airport is subject to proprietary
regulation. 8 Furthermore, the Court does not seem to have resolved
the immediate and substantial questions about airport regulation
that public and private sectors had raised. On one hand, many
municipal airport owners had been considering curfews and other
operational restrictions on jet aircraft as possible means for alleviat-
ing the noise pollution in communities surrounding airports, and
they had hoped for a go-ahead signal from the Burbank Court that
such regulations would be permitted. On the other hand, airlines
and aircraft companies feared that piecemeal local restrictions on air
traffic might stunt the growth of air commerce, felt that uniform
federal regulations would better protect their interests, 9 and hoped
that Burbank would resolve the issue of local versus federal control
in favor of the latter. Because the Court's holding does not expressly
preclude local proprietary regulations, it remains to be seen what
impact the decision will have on the division of federal and local
authority in the field of airport noise regulation. While it is arguable
that Burbank does not preclude municipal proprietary regulation of
airports, the policy implications of the Supreme Court's preemption
reasoning suggest that such regulation may not be tolerated in
subsequent decisions.
In order to analyze the implications of Burbank upon the role of
municipal power in the field of aircraft noise regulation, this note
will first discuss the reasoning behind the Court's finding of federal
preemption of the Burbank ordinance. It will then examine some of
the judicial presumptions upon which this finding was grounded. In
particular, it will focus upon the Supreme Court's treatment of the
broad congressional grant of authority to the FAA and its apparent
willingness to weigh agency practices as a factor in determining
whether or not Congress possessed preemptive intent. Finally, the
note will explore the vital issue of preemption of municipal propri-
etary noise regulations in light of the Burbank holding and will
suggest an alternate means by which federal law may create uniform
regulation without disregarding the problems and needs of airport
communities.
The principal piece of federal legislation dealing with air traffic
is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.'° This Act declares the
sovereignty of the United States over its airspace," establishes the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and broadly authorizes the
FAA to enact regulations for the purpose of insuring the safe and
efficient use of airspace and the protection of persons on the
ground.' 2 This Act was amended in 1968 to authorize the FAA
9 Id.
9 Aviation Week & Space Technology, Nov. 6, 1972, at 19.
19 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970).
11 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1970).
12 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Administrator is authorized and directed to develop plans for and
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Administrator to prescribe regulations for the control and abatement
of aircraft noise and sonic boom." It was further amended by the
Noise Control Act of 1972 (1972 Act)" to require the participation of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in formulating aircraft
noise regulations.
The Federal Aviation Act and its amendments contain no lan-
guage expressly preempting local noise regulation. In order to de-
termine whether or not Burbank's local regulations could exist under
the imposing shadow of federal authority, the Court was obliged to
look for evidence of congressional intent to preempt. It began its
search by following the path of preemption analysis set forth in Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp." In Rice, the Court began with the
assumption that since the field in question was one which the states
have traditionally occupied, state authority in the field would not be
superseded by federal law unless such supersession was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress. 16 Since it is often unclear from
the face of a statute whether or not Congress intended to preempt
local legislation," the Supreme Court, while ostensibly looking for
evidence of congressional intent, has established several policy
guidelines for determining which situations require a finding of
federal preemption." In the absence of some overriding policy
formulate policy with respect to the use of the navigable airspace; and assign by rule,
regulation, or order the use of the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions,
and limitations as he may deem necessary in order to insure the safety of aircraft and
the efficient utilization of such airspace. . . . (c) The Administrator is further
authorized and directed to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations governing the
flight of aircraft, for the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft, for the
protection of persons and property on the ground, and for the efficient utilization of
the navigable airspace, including rules as to safe altitudes of flight and rules for the
prevention of collision between aircraft, between aircraft and land or water vehicles,
and between aircraft and airborne objects.
13 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970). Prior to its further amendment in 1972, the Act provided in
part that the Administrator, "FYI order to afford present and future relief and protection to the
public from unnecessary aircraft noise and sonic boom, . . . shall prescribe and amend such
rules and regulations as he may find necessary to provide for the control and abatement of
aircraft noise and sonic boom. . . ." Id.
14
 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. [I 1972), amending 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970):
In order to afford present and future relief and protection to the public health and
welfare from aircraft noise and sonic boom, the FAA, after consultation with the
Secretary of Transportation and with EPA, shall prescribe and amend standards for
the measurement of aircraft noise and sonic boom and shall prescribe and amend
such regulations as the FAA may find necessary to provide for the control and
abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom, including the application of such
standards and regulations in the issuance, amendment, modification, suspension, or
revocation of any certificate authorized by this title. . .
I s 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
' 6 Id. at 230.
' 7
 This is especially true where Congress grants broad regulatory power to a federal
agency, since Congress cannot anticipate the different ways that agency regulations will affect
state laws. See generally Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U.
L. F. 515.
16
 411 U.S. at 633, citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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reason for respecting the state law, preemption will be presumed:
where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make
reasonable .the inference that Congress left no room for the states to
supplement it;' 9 where the state policy may produce a result incon-
sistent , with the objective of the federal legislation (interference); 2 G
where the federal act touches an area of exclusive federal power; 21
or where the objective of the federal statute requires a uniform
system of regulation. 22
Applying the principles enunciated in Rice, the Burbank Court
found preemption of Burbank's regulations because of the pervasive
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise. 23 In reaching its
finding of preemption, the Court relied on a variety of legislative
sources. It noted that the Noise Control Act of 1972, Congress' most
recent expression on the subject of airport noise, gave the FAA, in
conjunction with the EPA, broad authority to promulgate any regu-
lations needed to protect the public from aircraft noise." Since this
1972 Act granted broad, but not necessarily exclusive, regulatory
authority to the FAA, the Burbank majority found it necessary to
look into the legislative history of the Act in order to find more
specific evidence of Congress' preemptive intent. Although both the
House and Senate committee reports stated that the proposed act
would not alter the then current preemptive status of federal noise
regulation, 25 the Court probed deeper into the origin and develop-
ment of the 1972 Act, because of its belief that Congress' most recent
pronouncement on aircraft regulation contained the best evidence of
Congress' preemption policy. 26 Prior to 1972, federal noise control
was a matter within the general regulatory scope of the Federal
I° E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
2° E.g., Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
2 ' E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
22 E.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
23 411 U.S. at 633. State police power as a justification for interference with air com-
merce had been challenged in the courts as early as 1956. In Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v.
Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956),
a village ordinance making it a crime to fly aircraft over the village at altitudes under 1000
feet was held to be preempted. The court ruled that air traffic control was a field of regulation
which Congress had preempted to the complete exclusion of conflicting legislation of states
and their agencies.
In American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N,Y. 1967),
aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), a town noise restriction which would have prevented
aircraft from using five runways at nearby Kennedy International Airport was held to conflict
with federal air traffic regulations and was therefore preempted.
In American Airlines, Inc. v. City of Audubon Park, 297 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Ky. 1968),
an ordinance prohibiting overflights at altitudes under 750 feet was found to be invalid as an
undue burden on interstate commerce.
The Burbank decision, however, represented the first instance in which preemption of a
local police power noise ordinance was affirmed on the basis of pervasive federal control
rather than on the more narrow ground of actual conflict with federal regulations.
24 411 U.S. at 628-33.
2S
 Id. at 634,
26 See id. at 634-35.
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Aviation Act, but Congress had not ''given the FAA specific respon-
sibility for airport noise control." However, the legislative history of
the 1972 Noise Control Act appeared to the Court conclusively to
authorize such specific responsibility. 28 Relying upon the statements
of congressmen whose committees had reported on the bill, 29
 the
Court sought evidence of a congressional intent that responsibility
for airport noise control be shouldered by the FAA.
The Court found the FAA empowered to utilize a pervasive
body of noise restrictions such as curfews and restrictive flight
scheduling as means of regulating noise levels. It was thus able to
conclude that the granting of such pervasive federal control evi-
denced congressional intent to preempt local regulations. It ap-
peared, however, that the Court's finding of preemption rested not
only upon the existence of extensive federal noise control powers,
but also upon the belief that locally administered noise control
would defeat Congress' larger goal—that of,having the FAA exercise
nationwide regulatory control over air commerce to insure air safety
and efficiency. 3° The Court could not really consider the question of
preemption of local airport noise regulations without taking into
account the impact of such local regulations upon the ability of the
FAA to carry out its overriding responsibility to regulate air
commerce. 31
 Emphasizing the possibilities for interference with air
commerce inherent in local noise ordinances, the Court accepted the
district court's finding that the imposition of curfews on a nation-
wide basis would result in a bunching of flights during those hours
before and after the curfew, which in turn would bring about
increased traffic congestion and a concomitant decrease in safety and
27
 Id. at 643 (dissenting opinion).
29
 Id. at 633.
29
 The Court quoted Congressman Staggers, Chairman of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which submitted the 1972 Noise Control Act and Report,
Congressman Staggers said:
I cannot say what industry's intention may be, but I can say to the gentleman what
my intention is in trying to get this bill passed. We have evidence that across
America some cities and States are trying to do [sic] pass noise regulations. Certainly
we do not want that to happen. It would harass industry and progress in America.
That is the reason why I want to get this bill passed during this session.
118 Cong. Rec. H10,294 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972), cited in 411 U.S. at 636-37. Of Sen.
Turiney, a member of the Senate Committee on Public Works, which submitted the Act and
Report, the Court said:
He made clear that the regulations to be considered by EPA for recommendation to
FAA would include: . . proposed means of reducing noise in airport environments
through the application of emission controls on aircraft, the regulation of flight
patterns and aircraft and airport operations, and modifications in the number,
frequency, or scheduling of flights . . . [as well as' . . . the imposition of curfews on
noisy airports . . . .
411 U.S. at 637, citing 118 Cong. Rec. 518,644 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) (emphasis in
original).
30
 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348(c), 1431(d)(3) (1972).
Ri
 See 411 U.S. at 627.
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efficiency. 32 Furthermore, the fractionalized control of the time of
take-offs and landings would severely limit the flexibility of the FAA
in controlling air traffic flow, a complex operation presently coordi-
nated on a national basis. 33 The Supreme Court agreed that such
results would be totally inconsistent with the objectives of the fed-
eral statutory and regulatory scheme. J 4 By stressing its belief that a
curfew would defeat the Federal Aviation Act objectives of air
safety and efficiency, the Court demonstrated that its finding of
preemption was grounded largely upon this functional considera-
tion, rather than solely upon a finding of congressional preemptive
intent in the limited area of noise regulation." Although the legisla-
tive history of the Noise Control Act of 1972, by itself, might not
have supported a finding of federal preemption, the Court's willing-
ness to consider the additional factor of local interference with air
commerce enabled it to reach the result that it did. The majority
differed on this issue with the dissent, which, having failed to weigh
the impact of noise regulation upon air commerce, argued that the
Federal Aviation Act and its amendments were not intended to
establish complete and preemptive federal noise controls. 36
32
 Id. It appeared to the District Court that if the curfew ordinance were held to be
valid, similar ordinances would be passed by all cities surrounding airports. See Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, .318 F. Supp. 914, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
33
 411 U.S. at 639.
34 Id. at 627-28.
35
 In preemption cases involving regulation of commerce, the Court will often look to the
effects of a local police power ordinance to determine whether it unreasonably burdens
interstate commerce, while framing its opinion in the language of preemption. See Note,
Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 208
(1959). In the Burbank case, however, a proper evaluation of the ordinance's burden on
interstate commerce—which dissenting Justice Rehnquist maintained was dependent on the
facts of the case and not on the "predicted proliferation of possibilities," 411 U.S. at 654
(dissenting opinion)—might have led to a different conclusion. The Burbank curfew had the
effect of prohibiting only one scheduled commercial flight a week, plus a number of corporate
jet takeoffs. Both commerce clause and preemption analyses use the "need for a uniform
system of regulation" as a standard for invalidating state laws. But while substantial interfer-
ence with interstate commerce must be shown in commerce clause cases—see, e.g., California
v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520
(1959)—invalidation by preemption is a more flexible standard. If a local ordinance of the
category in question would interfere with the uniform system of regulations necessary for
achieving Congress' purposes, the Court may strike it down. Thus, although the Burbank
curfew itself might not have offended the commerce clause, the Court thought the category of
police power noise regulations had to be preempted. This approach has been criticized for
resulting in overbroad preemption, excluding all state regulation from the field rather than
just the offending legislation. See Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemp-
tion, 21 De Paul L. Rev. 630 (1972).
36 The dissent had maintained that the 1958 Act did not so much as mention airport
noise, that the 1968 Amendment was designed to regulate the mechanical design aspect of
aircraft noise emissions rather than airport operating procedures, and furthermore that the
Noise Control Act of 1972 merely included the EPA in the formulation of regulations
authorized by the 1968 Amendment, but was not intended to alter the extent of federal
preemption in the area of airport noise regulation. 411 U.S. at 641-42, 650-51 (dissenting
opinion).
853
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
It is further arguable that the Court's broad construction of the
FAA's power over air commerce, which transformed the 1968 and
1972 noise amendments' non-exclusive grants of power into preemp-
tive law, was heavily influenced by FAA behavior of a preemptive
nature. In order to understand fully the role of FAA behavior in the
Court's determination, it is first necessary to consider the general
theoretical position of agency activity in the judicially developed
preemption matrix.
When Congress gives a federal agency broad regulatory power
and does not expressly address itself to the question of preemption,
the Supreme Court has felt free to presume congressional intent to
preempt state regulation of matters subject to federal agency con-
trol, especially when the agency has expressed the desire and capac-
ity to regulate such matters." This presumption is based on the
theory that Congress could not have intended state competition with
federal authorities in a field regulated by a federal agency. 38 Such a
presumption springs from the existence of a federal agency which
not only has a grant of regulatory power broad enough to regulate
the subject covered by the competing local ordinance, but also
exercises a continuous regulatory function and can easily respond to
the perceived needs of the field. In Burbank, the FAA was in a
position to respond to the demands of local noise regulation by
virtue of its Traffic Control Centers in every major commercial
airport. Moreover, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 had never been
construed to prohibit federal regulation of noise, and the FAA had
demonstrated its authority to pass airport noise regulations." At the.
Hollywood-Burbank Airport itself, the FAA Chief of the Air Traffic
Control Tower had issued a runway preference order prescribing
procedures to be followed for abatement of noise at night. 4° Under
such circumstances, the failure of the FAA to establish a curfew was
looked upon by the Supreme Court as an agency judgment that
noise control policy did not require such regulation."
Thus, where regulatory authority has been broadly granted to a
federal agency, the Court, while ostensibly searching for congres-
" See Note, supra note 35, at 216-17. Cf., e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297
(1961); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
38
 Whenever the Court bases a preemption decision on a "pervasive scheme of federal
regulation," broad agency control is invariably the type of regulation to which it refers.
Hirsch, supra note 17, at 549.
39 411 U.S. at 639-40. See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n v. City of Inglewood, 12 Av. L. Rep.
17,818, 17,821-23 (1972) (lists similar FAA regulations for noise control at Los Angeles
International Airport).
4° Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1972).
41
 The FAA runway preference order was intended by the agency "to reduce community
exposure to noise to the lowest practicable minimum." 411 U.S. at 626 n.2. Once it is
established that Congress intended completely to occupy a field of regulation, a local ordi-
nance which calls for a more pervasive scheme of regulation is nugatory. See Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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sional intent, has accepted an agency's preemptive behavior as evi-
dence establishing a presumption of preemption. 42
 Viewing the
FAA's activity in this manner, the Court felt that the 1968 and 1972
Noise Control Amendments ratified an FAA determination that
noise control regulation was within the scope of its powers. 43 The
presumption was thereby strengthened that the FAA should totally
occupy the field of noise regulation in order to exercise its primary
responsibility of air commerce regulation.
Despite its finding of preemption in the instant case, the Court
limited its effect to a prohibition of airport noise regulations which
constitute an exercise of local police power. This limitation was
justified by the fact that the regulations challenged were those of a
locality which was not the proprietor of the airport it sought to
regulate. The question of whether or not a locality as lessor and
proprietor of an airport may issue noise regulations was expressly
left unanswered." Yet this is the crucial question, since all the
major commercial airports in the country except Hollywood-
Burbank are owned and operated by the municipalities they serve.°
These municipal proprietors are the primary targets of community
protests about noise in neighborhoods adjacent to their airports, and
they, rather than the federal government or individual airlines, are
financially responsible for the detrimental effects of airport noise. 46
This note will now turn to a discussion of the question whether
municipal proprietors are preempted from effectively responding to
the problem.
Prior to the Burbank decision, the Senate Report on the 1968
Noise Abatement Amendment recognized a distinction between an
outside community interfering with air commerce and a municipal
airport proprietor trying to run its airport operation effectively:
[T]he proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a
State or local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport,
from issuing regulations or establishing requirements as to
the permissible level of noise which can be created by
aircraft using the airport. . . . Just as an airport owner is
responsible for deciding how long the runways will be, so
is the owner responsible for obtaining noise easements
necessary to permit the landing and takeoff of [noisier]
aircraft.'"
42 See Note, supra note 35, at 216-17.
43
 411 U.S. at 633.
44
 Id. at 636 n.14. Since the owners of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport were in no
position to argue the cause of a municipal proprietor, despite the possibly controlling
similarities in their positions, the Court properly limited its holding to the factual situation.
45 Id.
46
 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
47 S. Rep. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968). However, the Supreme Court made
it clear in Burbank that federal preemption of noise regulation was not based solely on the
1968 Amendment, but also upon the larger needs of air commerce regulation and the FAA's
capacity to deal effectively with noise.
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Assuming arguendo that Congress did not intend to preempt pro-
prietary restrictions, the inquiry would then shift to whether the
federal and local regulations would be likely to conflict in practice.
Where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physi-
cal impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce, a holding
of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no
inquiry into congressional design. 48
The broad preemption language in the Burbank decision would
seem to apply to proprietary interference with the scheme of federal
noise regulation. The Court stated that the interdependent factors of
safety, efficiency, and the protection of persons on the ground,
which the FAA Administrator is required to balance in adopting
noise control regulations, require a "uniform and exclusive system of
federal regulation if the congressional objectives underlying the Fed-
eral Aviation Act are to be fulfilled." 49 The FAA, now in conjunc-
tion with the EPA, the Court concluded, "has full control over
aircraft noise, preempting state and local control." 5° Municipal
proprietary noise regulations would disrupt the required uniformity
and exclusivity of the FAA's regulatory system no less than would
the non-proprietary regulations declared unconstitutional in Bur-
bank. Presumably, then, such proprietary regulations could be in-
validated on preemptive principles emanating from the Burbank
holding.
Airport operators, however, would argue that the proprietor's
need to control noise must be respected, despite the federal need for
uniform safety regulations. At issue, then, is the proprietary right of
an airport-owning locality to regulate air service for purposes of
noise control versus the need of Congress to regulate a safe, substan-
tially unburdened flow of air commerce. The Senate Report main-
tains that the federal government is in no position to require an
airport to expand to accommodate larger, noisier jets." Since the
municipality is financially responsible for damage to the surrounding
environment caused by noise, it should be able to.protect itself from
liability by regulating the use of its facility by certain types of
aircraft. 52 Furthermore, as the dissent in Burbank contended, a
municipal airport proprietor could not be prevented from taking the
more drastic step of permanently closing down the facility and
should therefore be able to regulate the use of its airport on the basis
of noise considerations. 53
However, municipal use of existing facilities is not beyond the
influence of the federal government. In addition to its interest in
48 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
45
 411 U.S. at 639.
5° Id. at 633.
31 S. Rep. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968).
52
 Brief for Port Authority of New York and New Jersey as Amicus Curiae, City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
" 411 U.S. at 653 (dissenting opinion).
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preventing interference with federal air commerce regulations, Con-
gress has emphasized that expansion of the public airport is essential
if the national system of airways is to meet the demands of interstate
commerce." The municipality remains the owner and main
beneficiary of its airport operation, just as the state is the owner of
its roads which are used in interstate commerce. But state and local
interests must be balanced against the need for the unburdened flow
of interstate commerce. A state can go so far as to exclude heavy
vehicles where necessary to protect its roads, since the regulation of
highways has been held to be a local concern with little incentive to
deal with the problem at the national level." However, Burbank
establishes that control over air commerce is a more vital national
concern requiring uniform national regulation. Closing down the
facilities of a high density commercial airport or substantially limit-
ing the use of its existing facilities without FAA approval, despite
the proprietor's vulnerable financial position," would probably be
found to be an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce for at
least two reasons. First, as the Court noted in Burbank, the FAA's
flexibility in•controlling air traffic flow would be severely limited."
Second, such an action by a municipality would be likely to deprive
a region of the means necessary to engage in increasingly necessary
air commerce."
If the Supreme Court majority had been content to invalidate
police power curfews by non-proprietor communities on the basis of
the curfew's interference with federal safety regulations, its
54 Airport & Airways Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1970), as
amended, Pub. L. No. 93-44, 87 Stat. 88 (1973). Federal funds have contributed to the
development of most major commercial airports since 1946. Act of May 13, 1946, ch. 251, § 2,
60 Stat. 170, repealed, Act of May 21, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 235.
35 South Carolina v, Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). But see Castle v. Hayes
Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954), where a carrier was engaged in interstate trucking
operations under authority of a certificate granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
and the action of a state in barring the carrier from the state's highways for violation of the
state's weight limit requirement constituted an unauthorized revocation of a federally granted
right.
. Just as interstate truckers arc licensed by federal agencies, so must all commercial air
carriers in the United States be certified by the Civir Aeronautics Board. 49 U.S.C. § 1371
(1970).
56 It has been suggested that a finding of federal preemption of proprietary noise
regulations would require an overruling of the Griggs decision in order to make the federal
government liable for noise damages. See note 33 supra. The FAA apparently anticipated and
sought to avoid such a sequence of events in its refusal to prescribe noise levels for specific
airports. See 34 Fed. Reg. 18,355-56 (1969). The theory that federal preemption of the airport
proprietor's right to regulate noise will lead inevitably to undeserved monetary liability is
questionable in practice, since the FAA would be required to pass and enforce demonstrably
necessary noise regulations, or be liable to those affected. Furthermore, the cost to a local
airport of taking noise easements is largely compensable by the federal government, which
recognizes such expenses as legitimate costs of airport development. 49 U.S.C. § 1720 (1970).
Recovery, nationally, for noise related damages has amounted to approximately one tenth of
one percent of the claims. EPA, Report on Airport-Aircraft Noise § 3, at 70 (1973).
57 411 U.S. at 639.
5° See Airport & Airways Development Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970).
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reasoning would have left room for municipal proprietors to issue
noise regulations, providing such regulations did not interfere with
the requirements of safety in air commerce. 59
 Undoubtedly,
proprietary noise regulations have greater local justification than do
non-proprietary police power ordinances, vis-à-vis interstate
commerce, since airport operators are more likely to balance the
need for efficient use of airport facilities with noise considerations
than are self-interested neighboring communities." In addition,
municipal proprietors are more prone to enforce noise regulations
than is the FAA, 6 ' because they are more directly answerable to
citizens and because they presently run the risk of financial liability
if the noise is not controlled. Considering the importance of the local
interest involved, proprietary restrictions should be examined
individually by courts to determine the extent of their interference
with federal regulations rather than collectively preempted, as was
the general category of police power ordinances in Burbank.
However, by formulating a presumption, based upon the breadth of
the FAA's agency powers, that the field of noise regulation was
preempted by the FAA, the Supreme Court appears to have ruled
out the possibility of such individual treatment in proprietary cases.
In a field where federal regulation is pervasive, local regulations on
the same subject are preempted regardless of whether or not they
interfere with the federal scheme. While the Supreme Court
indicated that it was not addressing the municipal proprietor, the
reasoning of Burbank may nevertheless be extended to preempt
proprietary regulations as well.
The Supreme Court's decision in Burbank thus implies a serious
threat to federal-state cooperation in controlling airport noise
pollution. Although the Court majority found that the FAA had
pervasive control of the field, thus theoretically excluding all local
regulation, the FAA has often been willing to allow municipal
proprietary noise restrictions which are not inconsistent with FAA
regulations. 62
 The Port Authority of New York, for example, has
enforced a system of decibel restrictions on jet operations for over
twenty years. 63
 Furthermore-, the EPA's proposed regulations for
abating airport noise, authorized by the Noise Control Act of 1972,
will be submitted in 1974 for FAA approval and adoption. The EPA
had expected to conclude that airport operators should be permitted
59
 Cf. Aircraft Owners & Pilots' Ass'n v. Port Authority, 305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y.
1969); Port Authority v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
6°
 See American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226, 233 (E.D.N.Y.
1967), afFd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968).
61
 Cf. Citizens for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 577 (E.D. Va. 1972) (indicates the
FAA's enforcement record).
62
 See American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp, 226, 232 (E.D.N.Y.
1967), affd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968); Port Authority v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 259 F.
Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
63 See Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Problem: Federal Power But Local Liability, 3 Urban
Law. 175, 198 (1971).
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to restrict airport, runway use, employ curfews, and establish
economic incentives to encourage noise reduction, where such
programs are consistent with air safety." These tentative
conclusions represented a policy determination that local
cooperation with federal authorities is a necessary concomitant to
the framing of responsive solutions to the noise pollution problem. It
was assumed that the FAA would continue to regulate the field of
air commerce, but would "share" regulatory responsibility with
localities and thereby defer as much as possible to important local
interests, such as the particular needs of an airport's surrounding
environment and the extent of airport service desired.
In light of the Supreme Court's Burbank rationale, however,
the EPA felt that federal promulgation of national noise regulations
would be required and would apply even to municipal airport
proprietors. 65 The EPA now intends to make noise controls part of
the existing FAA airport certification program. Airports not initially
in compliance with the regulations would be required to submit
implementation plans for meeting the standards. When approved,
the implementation plan would be adopted as a federal regulation
for the airport and would be enforceable by the FAA. 66
The EPA's suggestions fit into the existing scheme of federal
law in which federal agencies are encouraged to solicit local input
prior to issuing regulations. 67
 Yet the alternative of federal-local
cooperative regulation should not be sacrificed so readily. On the
basis of Burbank and prior case law, the EPA may be able to apply
and the Court may be able to construe Burbank as permitting
municipal proprietary regulations approved by the FAA.
When Congress gives a federal agency broad regulatory powers,
courts tend to infer that the subject matter should have one regula-
tory master and thus presumptively invalidate state laws imposing
requirements which could be impbsed by the federal agency. 68 The
corollary to this judicial inference and presumption should be that
Congress has in fact delegated to the agency the authority to make
preemption decisions in regard to the exercise of that power. 69 Prior
to an agency investigation, Congress is not likely to know what
division of federal-state authority will best serve its objectives. 7 °
Therefore, if the agency determines that cooperation with local
authority would further the partiCular national policy involved, its
determination should be weighed heavily be the courts.
64
 Aviation Week & .Space Technology, May 14, 1973, at 23.
65 EPA, Report on Airport-Aircraft Noise 3, at 62 (1973).
BB Id. at 64-66.
67 49 U.S.C. § 1343(i) (1970).
BB
 See text at notes 36-43 supra.
' 69
 Cf. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 515, 552.
70 This accounts for Congress' typical silence on the question of preemption, since it
cannot fully anticipate what administrative regulations the agency will need to formulate and
what role state and local government will seek to play in the overall regulatory scheme.
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2 However, the Supreme Court has apparently failed to recognize
that when Congress delegates broad regulatory powers to an agency,
Congress' primary intent is to allow the agency to regulate the field
effectively.” While the Court is often willing to use agency activity
as evidence of preemption, 72 it is less eager to use evidence of
agency cooperation with state authorities to conclude that state
regulation is permitted. In Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson," a
federal statute providing for inspection of renovated butter was held
to preempt a state statute requiring inspection of the ingredients
used in the manufacture of renovated butter, on the ground that
federal superintendence of the field precluded state regulation of the
same subject. The Court reached this result even though federal
officials welcomed the state agency's cooperation as a means of
supplementing the shortage of federal inspectors needed to police the
industry effectively. The Court's approach further discounted the
fact that certain contaminated ingredients which were easily
recognizable only before manufacturing, which frequently made
state inspection the only effective safeguard. 74 Once federal power
was deemed to be exclusive, agency intent to cooperate with state
officials was ignored.
Where cooperation with a state agency appears to be envisioned
by Congress, the Court will look more favorably on a federal
agency's deferral to state power. Thus, in Mintz v. Baldwin," a
state regulation concerning the transportation of cattle with Bang's
disease was upheld, even though the Secretary of Agriculture was
empowered to establish regulations regarding interstate transporta-
tion of cattle from any place where he believed the disease existed.
The Court believed that Congress recognized the local character of
the problem and intended to allow state regulation where the Sec-
retary of Agriculture chose not to exercise his power. 76 Likewise, in
Parker v. Brown," the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to
regulate raisin marketing in order to promote uniformity and stabil-
ity in federal and state programs. Since ninety percent of the raisins
grown in the United States were produced in California, the Secre-
tary chose not to regulate the California market, but instead to assist
California's state marketing regulation program. The state laws
were held to be valid against a claim of federal preemption. Where a
federal law contemplates the existence of state programs, there is no
occupation of the field until the federal agency acts. 78
71 See Comment, The Impact of Preemption on Federal-State Cooperation, 1967 U. III.
L.F. 656, 662; California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 737 (1949).
72 See note 31 supra.
73 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
74 Id. at 172-75 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
15 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
74 Id. at 351.
77 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
78 Id. at 354.
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Although the Court sanctioned federal-state cooperation in
Mintz and Parker, the decisions were based on the Court's charac-
terization of the federal legislation as not excluding local
legislation. 79 The grant of power from Congress to the FAA, on the
other hand, is likely to be considered so pervasive as to give the
FAA exclusive control over noise regulation. But such a finding
would not necessarily prevent the Court from validating FAA deci-
sions which cede authority to municipal airport proprietors. A
finding of pervasiveness by the Court has traditionally meant that
even local regulations which purport not to interfere with the federal
scheme are precluded. It is submitted, however, that such regula-
tions, when sanctioned by the FAA as a necessary part of its overall
regulatory scheme, should be permitted. 8° Congress' creation of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) indicates by analogy that .
such an approach by the FAA would not exceed the scope of
administrative authority. Congress has preempted the field of labor
disputes which affect interstate commerce, but the NLRB has been
permitted to cede jurisdiction to state agencies so long as the state
agencies avoid actions inconsistent with the NLRB regulations and
national uniformity is thereby maintained.$'
The Court, with good reason, is committed to act consistently
with the congressional objectives of the Federal Aviation Act
—namely, to provide a uniform system of air commerce regulation
in order to promote safety and efficiency. Allowing local proprietary
noise regulation without federal superintendence until the FAA is-
sues regulations at a specific airport directly superseding the local
regulations would put the requifed uniformity in danger. Under
such circumstances a local regulation could not be preempted unless
it directly interfered with FAA regulations, and determining the
status of such regulations would require frequent litigation. Yet a
decision to preempt such local regulation without more would elimi-
nate the FAA's option of dealing with airport noise by allowing
effective local enforcement, in contradiction to what appear to be
the policy objectives of the regulatory scheme. In preemption
decision-making, Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, has the
last word. But it would obviously, be an undue burden on Congress
to require it to negate the holding of preemption as to each indi-
vidual airport where the FAA from time to time deems it desirable
to allow local regulation. In order to permit local regulation at a
79 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-52 (1963).
8° An agency would still be restricted in the exercise of its preemption decision-making
power. It would be responsible to Congress, 'which can choose expressly to preempt state
authority at any time, and' to the courts, which'can prevent cession of authority not granted to
an agency by Congress.
II See, e.g., San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
Congress amended this procedure in 1959, alloWing the states to assert jurisdiction over cases
declined by the NLRB without requiring a formal cession by the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(I)
(1970).
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designated individual airport, the better course would be to allow
the FAA to make the tentative decision to "un-preempt" the field.
This FAA decision •would be "reviewable" by Congress, which can
at any time act to expressly preempt local authority. 82 Furthermore,
airlines would be quick to contest any overly restrictive local law on
the ground that it would conflict with existing federal policy.
Recognition of the agency role in preemption policy-making
would bring the Court a long way toward the development of a
realistic approach to the nature of administrative authority. 83 In a
time of increasing demands on local airport proprietors to reduce
environmental noise pollution, the Supreme Court would do well to
defer to the FAA determination of the division between federal and
state authority where Congress has not expressly spoken on preemp-
tion. Such an approach would give the Court a means of preventing
needless preemption of local regulations consistent with congres-
sional purposes, without eroding the principles enunciated in Bur-
bank.
DAVID STRAUSS
Labor Law—Pre-Hire Contracts in the Construction
Industry—Operating Engineers Local 150 v. NLRB (R.I. Smith
Construction Co.). '—Local 150 brought an unfair labor practice
action against R.J. Smith (the employer) alleging a refusal to bargain
in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act). 2 The employer had unilaterally increased selected em-
ployees' wage rates during the term of its contract with Local 150
and had failed to bring wage rates up to the level agreed upon in the
contract. 3 The relevant details of the bargaining relationship be-
82 One alternative to "un-preemption" would be to permit municipal proprietors to
establish the same regulations as those promulgated for each airport by the FAA. Cf.
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949). This approach would also allow enforcement by the
proprietor, although not on the selective basis the FAA has previously employed. An added
advantage of giving all municipal airport proprietors the power to enforce concurrent regula-
tions is that liability would be less likely to shift from the proprietor to the federal govern-
ment, thus maintaining the local incentive to control noise. Such an approach, however, also
depends on the assertion that a finding of pervasiveness does not prevent the FAA from
sanctioning com plementary regulation.
83
 The FAA has been making such de facto preemption decisions throughout its history.
It has chosen to permit the New York Port Authority, for example, to enforce the same types
of regulations recommended by the EPA. See note 52 supra.
1
 480 F.2d 1186, 83 L.R.R.M. 2706 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The statement of facts set forth
below is taken from id. at 1187-88, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2707-OS.
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer— ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title."
3
 Local 150 also alleged a violation of ft§ 8(a)(1) and (3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1970),
„in the company's discharge of the only two union workers in the employer's fairly stable
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